The ISCIP Analyst, Volume VII, Issue 1 by Comstock, Michael et al.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy The ISCIP Analyst
2002-01-16
The ISCIP Analyst, Volume VII, Issue
1
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/11981
Boston University
 1 
THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 7, Number 1 (January 16, 2002) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Michael Comstock 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Who's in, who's out 
The removal of Railways Minister Nikolai Aksenenko was completed this month 
with President Putin's decree relieving the minister of his duties. This final 
decision followed a recommendation by Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov in a 
meeting that touched also upon Russia's natural monopolies. (ITAR-TASS, 1741 
GMT, 3 Jan 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0103, via World News Connection) This 
constitutes a final chapter in Aksenenko's misadventure with the Putin 
administration, which began months ago. Kasyanov proposed Gennady Fadeev 
as Aksenenko's replacement, a move that has been confirmed by the president. 
Fadeev previously served as railways minister under the first Yel'tsin 
administration from 1992-1996. (INTERFAX, 1532 GMT, 4 Jan 02; FBIS-SOV-
2002-0104, via World News Connection) Aksenenko's dismissal and previous 
investigation by the prosecutor-general's office has been interpreted to be a 
move against Yel'tsin-era holdovers; his replacement by another Yel'tsin-era 
appointee indicates that the faction that supported Aksenenko's initial 
appointment has managed to maintain control of this lucrative post in the 
Russian government. As reported by the Russian radio station Echo Moskvy, 
Kasyanov himself is a member of this group. Additionally, Fadeev is Aksonenko's 
brother-in-law, giving the bureaucracy an even more dynastic appearance. 
(EKHO MOSKVY RADIO, 0400 GMT, 5 Jan 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
However, the prosecutor-general's office has fixated upon another personality 
within the administration. Reaching closer to Presidential Administration head 
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Aleksandr Voloshin, Prosecutor-General Vladimir Ustinov has announced that 
Voloshin's public adviser, Vyacheslav Aminov, is under investigation for bribery. 
Aminov, Prominvest's general director, has been released from custody, but is 
not allowed to leave Moscow. (INTERFAX, 29 Dec 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1229, via 
World News Connection) The prosecutor-general's office will investigate Aminov 
extensively, and its findings may lead to further charges against those around 
Aminov -- a prospect which must cause some alarm for Aleksandr Voloshin. 
There have been flurries of rumor about imminent resignations and dismissals 
surrounding Voloshin -- until now, all could be dismissed as baseless. However, 
given the fact that Ustinov's investigations often have preceded dismissal and 
disgrace (as in the case of Aksyonenko), the proximity of this most recent 
investigation to Voloshin cannot help but to raise eyebrows. 
 
Further personnel shuffling within Putin's administration has included the 
dismissal of Vladimir Rakhmanin as chief of Presidential Protocol and his 
simultaneous posting as ambassador to Ireland. His replacement is Igor 
Shchegolev, who until now has been head of the Presidential Press 
Administration. (INTERFAX, 1819 GMT, 29 Dec 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1229, via 
WoRld News Connection) These appointments most likely constitute a string of 
promotions -- Rakhmanin being rewarded for service with a less stressful 
ambassadorship, and Shchegolev being moved into a position of greater 
importance. Andrey Denisov has been promoted from ambassador to the Arab 
Republic of Egypt to deputy foreign minister of Russia. (ITAR-TASS, 0859 GMT, 
30 Dec 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1230, via World News Connection) Additionally, 
Anatoly Pristavkin, chairman of a recently disbanded pardons commission, has 
been appointed as a new presidential aide. (ITAR-TASS, 1650 GMT, 29 Dec 01; 
FBIS-SOV-2001-1229, via World News Connection) 
 
Putin has been focusing on Russia's energy crisis; at a recent meeting, he 
assigned to Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko the task of preparing a 
report on the causes of fuel and energy failures in several Russian regions. 
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Combined with recent fluctuations in market prices for crude oil, Russia has 
undergone serious economic upheaval in the past month. Khristenko was 
reported as saying that some stabilization had been achieved in coordination with 
OPEC; the full report is expected within the next month. (INTERFAX, 1401 GMT, 
10 Jan 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0110, via World News Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Turning into parties 
On 14 December, the Union of Right Forces (SPS) held a congress in the 
Pokrovsky forest resort in the suburbs of Moscow. About 300 delegates from 80 
regions arrived to consolidate the movement into an official party. The deputies 
re-elected the party chairman (Boris Nemtsov) and the co-chairpersons (Yegor 
Gaidar, Anatoly Chubais, Irina Khakamada, Sergei Kirienko), adopted a new 
party statute and program, and passed a number of resolutions (calling for 
cooperation with the West in creating a new security system and promising to 
assist several of the government's social and economic reforms). SPS deputies 
also demanded that Federation Council deputies be elected. (ITAR-TASS, 2041 
GMT, 14 Dec 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1215, via World News Connection) 
 
The December congress was not nearly as protracted and intense as the one 
last spring (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 13 Jun 01) and one deputy leader of the 
group, Viktor Pokhmelkin, felt that the party itself had lost some of its edge. He 
resigned, stating that "all the resources in fighting for transformation of the party 
have been exhausted." (INTERFAX, 1213 GMT, 19 Dec 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
1219, via World News Connection) A few days later Pokhmelkin was elected a 
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co-chairman of the Liberal Russia political movement, along with Boris 
Berezovsky, Sergey Yushenkov, Boris Zolotukhin and Galina Sartan. 
(INTERFAX, 1142 GMT, 22 Dec 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1222, via World News 
Connection) The YABLOKO movement also became a party and re-elected 
Grigory Yavlinsky as leader by a vote of 472 to 33. (INTERFAX, 0636 GMT, 22 
Dec 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1223, via World News Connection)  
 
and turning 180 degrees 
One leader, however, used an extraordinary meeting of his party to introduce a 
whole new twist to his party's position. On 13 December, the Liberal Democratic 
Party of Russia's Vladimir Zhirinovsky announced that the LDPR will abandon the 
anti-American and anti-Western sentiments in its foreign ideology. Zhirinovsky 
declared that "Russia and America can and must cooperate today, and there are 
all the conditions for this... the time has come for the three forces -- Russia, the 
USA and NATO -- to assume responsibility for world affairs." In fact, he went as 
far as to suggest that in 30 years Russia and the US "will combine their 
resources and form a single North Atlantic state." Yet, oddly enough, he 
compared the cooperation in the post-11 September world and the seizure of 
Kabul to the situation immediately after the conquest of Berlin in May 1945. 
(INTERFAX, 1247 GMT, 8 Dec 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1208, and INTERFAX, 0953 
GMT, 13 Dec 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1213, via World News Connection) Assuming 
that Zhirinovsky's grasp on history is sound enough to include the fact that, even 
before Berlin was divided, the Soviet Union and the United States became 
adversaries in the Cold War, it is interesting to ponder what he is trying to say 
with this analogy. 
 
REGIONS 
Elections and electricity 
In Yakutia, after a long and complicated election campaign, Vyacheslav Shtyrov, 
the president of the ALROSA diamond company, won the second round of the 
elections with 59.2 percent of the vote. The turnout was rather high -- 75.6 
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percent of eligible voters -- due in large part to the special measures taken by the 
Yakut central electoral commission. It offered 150-ruble coupons for housing 
services and lottery tickets with prizes (including a Volga car) totaling one million 
rubles. Shtyrov's victory is expected to be useful for the republic as well as for 
ALROSA. (LENTA.RU, 14 Jan 02, and ORT, 13 Jan 02; via www.ortv.ru) 
 
In many of Russia's other regions, shortages of electricity, heat and water 
(affecting hundreds of thousands) are of great concern. In the Amur region's city 
of Blagoveshchensk, residents picketed the Amurenergo office, while in the 
Irkutsk region, the mayor of Ust Kut resigned after heating problems were 
discussed in a live phone interview with President Putin. (ITAR-TASS, 0511 
GMT, 26 Dec 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1226, and ITAR-TASS, 1405 GMT, 27 Dec 
01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1227, via World News Connection)  
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Legislative wrap-up 
Before the Russian State Duma began its holiday recess, which will last until 
mid-January, it accepted draft bills "On the State of the Military" and "On the All-
Russian Census" (ORT, 27 Dec 01; via www.ortv.ru); passed the Labor Code in 
the third reading (ORT, 21 Dec 01; via www.ortv.ru); voted to put a five-year 
moratorium on human cloning in the Russian Federation; established a 10-
percent tax exemption for all print media and forbade all media sources to cite 
terrorists and extremists. (ORT, 20 Dec 01; via www.ortv.ru) 
 
MEDIA 
Treason and trials 
In Vladivostok, military journalist Grigory Pasko has been found guilty of "high 
treason in the form of espionage" and sentenced to four years imprisonment. 
Fellow journalists and supporters rallied in Moscow's Lubyanka square 
proclaiming his innocence, and several human rights groups joined. On 7 
January, about 60 demonstrators protested under the banner "Is Felix back?" 
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They represented ecological and human rights groups throughout Russia and the 
political party YABLOKO. Sergei Mironov called on Pasko to seek a presidential 
pardon -- however, such a move by Pasko would constitute an admission of guilt 
that Pasko has steadfastly denied. The Duma's State Security committee 
welcomed the guilty verdict and the public prosecutor protested that the sentence 
was too light. (INTERFAX, 1458 GMT, 25 Dec 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1225, and 
INTERFAX, 1058 GMT, 29 Dec 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1229, via World News 
Connection) 
 
Another attack on media freedom is developing rapidly: the TV6 saga. The 
Supreme Arbitration Court has upheld the order to liquidate the television 
channel. Yevgeny Kiselev, TV6's general-director and the host of the news 
program Itogi, declared that state policy towards the mass media is aimed at 
"doing away with any alternative opinions on television" and not allowing "an 
element of unpredictability in the coverage of major political events." Kiselev 
announced that his team will "use all legal options available," appeal against the 
ruling of the Supreme Arbitration Court and request the cancellation of the appeal 
against the ruling of the Moscow Federal Arbitration Court. (INTERFAX, 1539 
GMT, 8 Jan 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0108, via World News Connection) If none of 
the appeals proves effective, Kiselev is sure that there will be other outlets for the 
work of the TV6 staff, including the Internet, satellite and cable channels. 
(NTV.RU, 11 Jan 02) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Scott Bethel 
 
Where there's a crisis, there's an uncertain Russian foreign policy 
After a breakthrough year in foreign policy, President Vladimir Putin and his 
foreign policy team have taken some inconsistent steps of late. Putin and Foreign 
Minister Igor Ivanov navigated the turbulent international waters after the 11 
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September attacks on the US with extraordinary skill and seemed to make all the 
right moves. However, two recent opportunities have not met with bold and 
decisive policy initiatives. Specifically, the crisis between India and Pakistan and 
the implosion of the Argentine political-monetary system have seen tepid 
responses from Moscow. Though Russia has significant foreign policy interests 
in both areas, the efforts have seemed tentative and there does not appear to be 
a regional strategy compared to the effective efforts give the impression of closer 
coordination with the United States. 
 
The Pakistan-India crisis 
As the conflict between the neighboring Asian nuclear powers has escalated, 
there has been an ongoing show of interest and concern by Moscow, but only on 
the periphery. In fact, however, Russian weapons fuel the crisis from the Indian 
side. The crisis might provide Russia with an opportunity to be at the forefront of 
regional issues, but, so far, that has not been the case. 
 
Moscow has long been involved with the Indian military, trading arms and 
technology. India was the first to recognize the opportunity of acquiring advanced 
technology cheaply when it entered into a co-production deal with the Russians 
for the MiG-29 as early as 1991. (JANE'S DEFENCE ARCHIVE; via janes.com) 
This opened the door to a vastly increased level of cooperation between Delhi 
and Moscow. (Earlier, India made a similar deal concerning the MiG-23.) Over 
the intervening years India has ordered a significant amount of its hardware from 
the Russians, including major deals for T-90 tanks (PTI NEWS AGENCY, 1508 
GMT, 3 Jan 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) and for 
several naval combatants. Also, Russia has entered into further aircraft co-
production deals, including making India the first to co-produce the advanced 
Russian Su-30 multi-role fighter. (ITAR-TASS, 1402 GMT, 28 Dec 01; BBC 
Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) India is Russia's second largest 
arms customer following only China, with Iran third. (JANE'S DEFENCE 
WEEKLY, 24 Jan 02; via janes.com)  
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Moscow has expressed strong concern about the situation between Pakistan and 
India and condemned the "terrorist act" on the Indian parliament, but fell short of 
actually placing any direct blame on the Pakistani government. (ITAR-TASS, 
1630 GMT, 15 Dec 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
President Putin only rarely makes public statements regarding the conflict. 
However, during the recent meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
forum (APEC), Putin expressed the desire for Russia to assume a greater 
leadership role in regional conflicts. (ITAR-TASS, 1257 GMT, 19 Oct 01; BBC 
Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
The other, and perhaps more powerful, regional actor with interest in the situation 
is China. The Chinese have several stakes in the final outcome of the conflict 
between its two nuclear neighbors. First, the Chinese are the main exporter of 
weapons to the Pakistanis. As the US in previous years withdrew support for the 
government in Islamabad, the Chinese moved rapidly to fill the void left by the 
Americans, offering inexpensive weapons in plentiful supply. (JANE'S DEFENCE 
ARCHIVES, 6 Jun 01; via janes.com) The Chinese also have a longstanding 
border dispute with the Indians and normally have sided with the Pakistanis in 
regional disputes. (REUTERS, 13 Jan 01; via dailynews@yahoo.com) Before the 
Afghan war, the US had moved closer to India, but those relations suffered with 
the subsequent warming of Pakistani-US relations (because of the political reality 
that the US required a regional base of operations). This placed the Indians in 
need of a major power sponsor. 
 
Russia, though, will be cautious in terms of how far to go in siding with India. On 
the one hand, India has proven an excellent customer for Russia's growing arms 
trade, indeed one of its best, longest-standing cash customers. However, 
President Bush needs a committed and stable ally in Gen. Musharraf and the 
Russians will have to step lightly on the Pakistani president's toes. Moscow also 
will look to maintain its warming relationship with the Chinese to ensure having 
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both a friendly power at its lengthiest frontier and to ensure that its top arms 
customer is happy. 
 
Therefore, the Russians have taken the easy road so far, at least publicly. 
Moscow issued a joint communiqué with China at the foreign ministry level, 
rather than by the heads of state. The communiqué said nothing of any serious 
consequence and urged both sides on the subcontinent to "exercise restraint to 
prevent further deterioration of the situation and China and the Russian 
Federation express deep concern over the current intensifying tension between 
India and Pakistan." (XINHUA, 1050 GMT, 7 Jan 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) At the end, this will be a delicate diplomatic dance 
for Putin and his foreign policy team. The Russians want to be more visible in 
regional affairs, while maintaining good relations with the players. Putin most 
likely will bide his time and see where the crisis leads, making statements only 
when strictly necessary. Until then, he'll keep cashing the checks from the Indian 
treasury. 
 
The Argentine crisis 
Russia has been working hard to make inroads into Central and South America 
over the last three years. One of Moscow's main targets has been fragile 
Argentina. Just days before the monetary and political crisis in Argentina turned 
ugly, a top Russian diplomat, Georgi Mamedov, met with ambassadors from the 
major Latin American countries to stress Russia's solidarity and commitment to 
the region. (ITAR-TASS, 1941 GMT, 20 Dec 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) Specifically, Mamedov committed his country to 
helping Argentina find a solution to its current crisis. 
 
Moscow's interest in this situation is two-fold. First, the Russians have cracked 
the South American arms market successfully. Brazil has agreed to allow Russia 
to participate in bidding for Brasilia's next fighter purchase (See THE NIS 
OBSERVED, 7 Nov 01) and Venezuela is interested in providing Russia with an 
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alternative launch site for its space program. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 29 Dec 
01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) In addition, Russian 
weaponry has long been the choice of guerrilla fighters, drug lords and 
paramilitaries throughout the region. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 10 Oct 01) 
Second, the US has not been aggressive in terms of increasing close ties, both 
militarily and politically, with its neighbors to the south. The efforts of the South 
American governments to foster increasingly close relationships with Russia 
reflect in part American disinterest and, in part, the desire of the South American 
countries to forge their own way rather than fold to "Yanqui Imperialism." 
(JANE'S DEFENCE, 6 Jul 01; via janes.com) 
 
For the Russians, however, the Argentine crisis is out of area. Putin and his 
foreign policy team are reluctant to become a driving force in the situation. First, 
the Argentine political-monetary crisis is quite messy. Amidst allegations and 
counter-allegations, three presidents have been sworn into office in the last 
month. Therefore, Moscow is unsure with whom to deal to effect any sort of a 
long-term or even interim solution. Second, the Russians feel the need to be part 
of a coalition solution. Thus, they have pursued a joint statement on the part of 
the G-8, but the group thus far has been unwilling to issue such a statement. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1438 GMT, 24 Dec 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
Russia most likely will leave the Argentine situation alone for the time being, 
choosing to concentrate on markets with more potential such as Brazil. In the 
long term, however, there are ample opportunities for Moscow to increase both 
visibility and activity in America's backyard. A major arms deal constitutes one 
approach concerning which the Russians already have both experience and 
success in other developing regions. 
 
In other news: the US ABM withdrawal is a non-issue in Moscow 
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The US announcement of its pullout from the 1972 ABM treaty did not meet with 
a major reaction in Moscow. The initial statement by President Bush led to a curt 
response by President Putin noting his disappointment, but vowing to continue 
dialogue with Washington. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov went further by saying, 
"Russia [will] continue talks with the United States to hammer out a new 
framework for the two countries' strategic relationship and to find ways to reduce 
offensive strategic armaments." (REUTERS, 15 Dec 01; via Yahoonews.com) 
Moreover, Ivanov stated that he hoped to meet with US Secretary of State Colin 
Powell to produce some alternative to the ABM treaty. 
 
It seems that the US withdrawal came as no surprise to anyone in Moscow. With 
all of the shuttle diplomacy regarding the matter through the fall of 2001, the 
respective positions were quite clear. Secretary Powell made four trips 
specifically aimed at an ABM compromise and the topic was high on the agenda 
for the Bush-Putin summit at the end of last year. 
 
The Russians have had ample opportunity to prepare for the eventual US 
withdrawal from this treaty. Moscow certainly will continue expressing 
disappointment in the press. But, the US probably assured the Russians that 
they have nothing to fear from the US pullout. Perhaps some sort of compromise 
was struck between Presidents Putin and Bush to ensure the US could continue 
with its National Missile Defense. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 28 Nov 01) The 
Russians want to maintain good relations with the US; the ABM treaty is a "dead 
horse." 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Walter Jackson 
 
Fall roundup 
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The Russian Duma is tackling not only the military budget increases which 
President Vladimir Putin needs to begin implementing his military modernization 
campaign, but also more fundamental issues such as how and when to 
implement an all-volunteer force and draft new laws permitting alternate national 
service. Meanwhile, the fall draft has ended with predictable results. The 
Sovetsky District (Nizhny Novgorod) has been a leader in recruit reforms. District 
leaders even have been conducting an alternate service experiment for several 
years now with positive results, but there remain many reasons for concern. 
According to a recent newspaper article, in the past two decades, over 1,000 
recruits from the district died during military service, including 252 in Chechnya. 
In the 2001 autumn call-up, 1,256 persons were recruited while 1,990 others 
evaded military service. The spring 2001 drive was slightly more successful: 
1,405 recruits, and 1,335 persons avoiding military service. 
 
According to A.V. Razumovsky, secretary of the Nizhny Novgorod Recruiting 
Commission, only 25 persons submitted applications for alternative service in 
2000; 33 persons submitted applications in 2001, and the city administration 
permitted nine of these not to join the Army. (PARLAMENTSKAYA GAZETA, 19 
Dec 01; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security Database) This is 
one example of local authorities taking charge. Yet, while these statistics are very 
good by Russian standards (in many districts those evading the draft make up 
much higher ratios), the fact remains that nationally, most young Russian men 
look for ways to avoid the draft. 
 
Alternate service 
The Russian Duma has drafted a bill on alternate service based largely on 
recommendations from the General Staff and the defense ministry. In its current 
form the bill allows for alternate service in noncombatant roles within the military, 
but with an additional year's service obligation. Another requirement is that 
alternate service personnel will be sent all over Russia and not be stationed 
close to home, as some had hoped. (STRANA.RU, 10 Jan 02; via RFE/RL 
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Newsline) The fact that the Duma is pursuing this option actively represents a 
giant step in the right direction for Russia's modernization efforts. In the long 
term, this option should improve the current draft evasion problem. 
 
However, this trend is unlikely to change until other significant military reforms, 
such as a pay scale on par with other government workers, and adequate and 
available housing become reality. The summer of 2002 will constitute the first big 
test of President Putin's military reforms. This is when (budget and oil prices 
permitting) significant pay increases kick in, replacing existing government 
subsidies. 
 
Macho men and women 
On top of the already monumental task of general military reforms involving 
better pay and allowances, there are also gender reform issues to be addressed. 
Over 115,000 Russian women (approximately 9.5 percent) serve in the military. 
Women make up an impressive 71 percent (81,100) of the total contract military 
service personnel, and 53 percent of the civilian specialists in the army. 
Promotion opportunities in the officer corps, however, are significantly fewer and 
account for only 3.2 percent (3,500) of the total number of officers, although 
30,000 women serve as warrant officers. However, Russia's premier military 
service, the Strategic Missile Forces, has over 20,000 women, half of whom are 
in combat roles on par with their male counterparts. 
 
Reportedly there are only 17 female colonels in the Russian Army, and currently 
there are no promotion opportunities to general. Of the women officers eligible for 
promotion to major, only 10 percent are selected. What do the Russian 
servicewomen think of this discrimination? Not surprisingly, according to data 
from a poll by the All-Russia Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociology, most of 
them consider such obstacles to advancement to be unfair. (TRUD, 4 Dec 01; 
FBIS-SOV-2001-1206, via World News Connection) As Russia attempts to mirror 
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the West in its military reforms, parity in advancement opportunities for women 
must be achieved, and will serve to strengthen the entire military reform process. 
 
MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 
Rosoboronexport looking better and better 
It has been just over one year since Rosvoorozhenie and Promexport merged 
into Russia's leading defense industry arms exporter Rosoboronexport. And what 
a successful year it was. As 2001 came to a close Russian President Vladimir 
Putin met with his Security Council to discuss past and future weapons exports. 
"The results [of 2001] are not bad, $4.4 billion dollars of foreign currency revenue 
for this year," Putin said. He also stated that "In effect, today we have only just 
begun to restore opportunities that we forfeited and to look at this field from new 
economic and geopolitical positions." (INTERFAX, 1451 GMT, 26 Dec 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-1226, via World News Connection) 
 
But as successful as 2001 was, there are much bigger plans for 2002. According 
to Rosoboronexport General Director Andrei Belyaninov, the exporter wants to 
become more than just a middleman in the future. Rosoboronexport intends to 
increase its stakes in top military hardware manufacturers in 2002, invest in 
newly forming defense industries, and ultimately evolve into an investment 
agency. (INTERFAX, 1126 GMT, 26 Nov 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1126, via World 
News Connection) As if these grandiose plans aren't enough, Rosoboronexport 
just acquired the controlling interests in the Russian Insurance Center Company, 
which seeks to counter the growing presence of foreign insurance companies in 
the Russian military-industrial market. According to Aleksandr Kravchenko, 
chairman of the board, the Russian Insurance Center currently provides 60 types 
of insurance to over 500 companies. (ITAR-TASS, 2015 GMT, 26 Dec 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-1226, via World News Connection) Adding an insurance arm to its 
infrastructure is a significant step to becoming an investment agency. In fact, 
Rosoboronexport is looking more and more like a Western defense industry 
giant.  
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How to get there from here 
According to Rosoboronexport's web page, to date there is a total of $13 billion in 
orders through 2006, equating to just over $2.6 billion per year. According to 
Belyaninov, exports in the past have been sent to 45 countries, with China, India, 
Cyprus, Algeria, Greece, Italy, Egypt and Kuwait making up 90% of sales. Sales 
breakdowns were 75% aviation, 12% naval, 5% ground equipment, air defense 
3%, and the rest 5%. (ROSOBORONEXPORT WEBSITE, 11 Jan 02; via 
rusarm.ru)  
 
To boost arms sales (and cash revenues to help fund his budget) President Putin 
has chartered the Committee for Military-Technical Cooperation (CMTC), to take 
the lead in the creation of a collegium to evaluate and improve the export 
process. One area of untapped potential is in the export of spare parts and 
technical/mechanical service to existing customers. In fact President Putin has 
issued a decree allowing weapons producers/exporters to enter into the sales 
and service end of exporting. (KOMMERSANT, 18 Dec 01; What the Papers 
Say, via ISI Defense and Security Database) The spare parts and service 
(contract support) are both very lucrative from a business standpoint. Existing 
(and paid for) machine dyes can produce spare parts inexpensively. Service 
contracts are even better with Russian engineer and technician salaries being 
paid by foreign governments (usually at a premium rate). The result is increased 
employment and tax revenues. 
 
Rekindling old flames 
The biggest concern to the US is the recent resumption of Russian arms sales to 
Iran. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 28 Nov 01) Moving rapidly since the "repeal" of 
the Chernomyrdin-Gore Pact in 2001, Iran by January 2002 will have received 
the last 2 of 21 Mi-171 helicopters from Russia; 30 additional Mi-171sh 
helicopters were ordered in 2001, with delivery starting in 2002. The Mi-171sh 
helicopters are armed with the Shturm anti-tank weapons system. (ITAR-TASS, 
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1309 GMT, 24 Dec 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1224, via World News Connection) But 
this is just the beginning. Russia is likely to continue to pressure the US into 
lifting sanctions against Iraq, the one Russian debtor which easily can pay in 
hard currency (that is, once oil sanctions are lifted). Iraq was historically (and 
potentially will be) a significant arms importer. Africa and South America are also 
markets that Russia is pursuing aggressively. 
 
Diamonds in the rough 
During a recent swing through Africa, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov laid 
the groundwork in Namibia to develop closer military and technological ties. 
Intrinsically linked with importing Russian arms is the export of Namibian 
diamonds. During a press conference, Ivanov praised the success of the Russian 
Diamond Company ALROSA in neighboring Angola. He stated that ALROSA 
"could take a proper place on the market of Namibia too." (ITAR-TASS, 2048 
GMT, 14 Dec 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1214, via World News Connection) This is but 
one example of Russia's aggressive (and apparently successful) global military 
and nonmilitary industrial marketing campaigns. Fortunately for Russia, Ivanov is 
not too bogged down fighting terrorism and creating coalitions like his US 
counterpart, Secretary of State Colin Powell. Given the current state of Russia's 
economy, the country's leaders are placing greater emphasis on that concern, 
while placating the US in the fight against world terrorism. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Following Russia's lead into Iran 
As Western countries increasingly have looked away from Ukraine, in many ways 
ceding the country to Russian influence, they also may have looked away from 
an important -- and ominous -- new feature of Ukrainian foreign policy. Over the 
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last several months, Ukraine's leaders have increased significantly their country's 
cooperation with Iran, in some ways mirroring the relationship that already exists 
between that Mideast country and Russia. This stepped-up cooperation is 
exemplified by a December meeting of Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoly Zlenko 
and Iranian Petroleum Minister Bijan Zanagneh. Following his talks with the 
petroleum minister, Zlenko announced, "I have brought a clear message from the 
Ukrainian side to offer a new stage in our bilateral relations, a stage of 
considerable change in the economic sphere for the good of our citizens." 
(INTERFAX, 27 Dec 01; via lexis-nexis) This statement signified a shift in 
Ukrainian policy; while the two countries have discussed expanding their bilateral 
relations in the past, the relationship always has been limited by Ukraine's ties to 
the West. Kiev has been reluctant to irritate Western powers concerned both with 
Iran's attempts to acquire ballistic missile technology and with its support for 
terrorist organizations. Now, the situation appears to have changed. 
 
At the December meeting, Zlenko wholeheartedly endorsed collaboration 
between the two countries within the energy sphere. In particular, Zlenko 
mentioned the Russian-supported proposal for a pipeline that would carry Iranian 
gas to Europe through Ukraine. With this pipeline, Zlenko said, "our state can 
diversify the sources of energy supplies, and Iran can get new technologies for 
the modernization of the oil and gas industry." The technology could include 
equipment for drilling and the assignment of "Ukrainian specialists," he 
explained. While the implementation of Zlenko's plan is questionable given 
Western (and in particular US) opposition to the pipeline proposal, just the 
suggestion of it points to a new era in Ukrainian-Iranian relations. Although this 
project may fail to come to fruition, others undoubtedly will succeed. At the same 
meeting, for example, the two sides initiated new proposals for cooperation in the 
fields of aircraft production, petrochemicals and agriculture. And therein lies the 
problem for the West. 
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In a 13 January Washington Post article, Michael Dobbs examined Iran's 
attempts to build a nuclear weapon and ballistic missile program with Russian 
help. That help resulted in sanctions against a number of Russian companies by 
the US government over two years ago. In response, Russia claims to have 
cracked down on what the country said were unauthorized technology transfers. 
Bush officials suggest, however, that Russia continues to assist Iran in 
developing "nonconventional" arms and ballistic missile delivery systems. 
 
With Ukraine actively engaged in several areas of Iranian industry, a new avenue 
now will open for Tehran. And, according to the information contained in Dobbs' 
article, it may be a very important avenue. Russian scientist Vadim Vorobei, who 
spent considerable time working in Iran on a ballistic missile program, said, 
"Their progress is very slow. In order to build missiles, you need a strong 
resource base. You need steel, aluminum, not to mention composite materials, a 
machine tool industry. Iran has very little of this." He continued, "They don't have 
any real metallurgical industry of their own. Their only hope is to steal something 
from neighboring countries, but they can't steal everything." (THE 
WASHINGTON POST, 13 Jan 02; via lexis-nexis) With Ukraine on their side, 
they may not need to. Ukraine's largest industry is metallurgy, with a special 
emphasis on steel. Combine this and other natural resources with the country's 
existing ballistic missile technology and, clearly, Iran could benefit from a closer 
association with Ukraine. 
 
While these plans are being formulated, little is being heard from Western 
quarters. True, these talks and statements of intention may amount to very little, 
but they also could amount to much more. As the US and its Western partners 
continue the fight against terrorism, it is possible that, while their backs are 
turned, one of the countries accused of supporting terrorists may be acquiring a 
very helpful new friend. 
 
MOLDOVA 
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Two languages for the price of one 
This week, the government of Moldova initiates a brand new educational policy -- 
compulsory education in the Russian language. Yes, for the first time in 10 years, 
school children in Moldova will be forced to study Russian. Initially, Education 
Minister Ilie Vancea suggested that the move was necessary because "Russian 
is the native tongue for one-third of our population," and a number of Russian-
speaking parents had requested that the language be available to their children. 
(ITAR-TASS, 2047 GMT, 3 Jan 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0103, via World News 
Connection) This explanation, however, is questionable at best. The parents 
about whom Vancea is so concerned always have had the opportunity to see that 
their children are educated in Russian -- the constitution grants them that right. 
Article 35 says, "The State will enforce under the law the right of each person to 
choose his/her language in which teaching will be effected." Therefore, actually, 
no change was necessary to satisfy this group. Should students wish to be 
educated solely in Russian, that possibility is available to them -- Russia has 
even donated textbooks to ensure it. 
 
Instead, the real explanation for the new law is likely closer to a statement 
released by the Russian foreign ministry. "The introduction of this subject as a 
discipline of study in the national education system of Moldova will contribute 
without a doubt to the interethnic communication and continued development of 
multilateral relations between Moldova and Russia," the statement reads. 
(BASAPRESS, 1715 GMT, 27 Dec 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1227, via World News 
Connection) The measure can also be interpreted as yet another move toward 
Moldova's eventual inclusion in the Russia-Belarus Union, where Russian is the 
language of record. As such, the law has generated what for Moldova is a large 
protest action. 
 
On 10 January, the opposition Christian Democratic Popular Party led a 
demonstration in downtown Chisinau that attracted nearly 2,000 persons -- 
mostly teachers. Although the rally was peaceful, police officials followed the 
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action by "visiting" those who spoke at the rally, and "suggesting" that state 
employees stay away from all future protests. In addition, Chisinau Police Chief 
Ion Curarari has asked that the prosecutor-general strip all Christian Democrats 
of their parliamentary immunity. (BASAPRESS, 1600 GMT, 11 Jan 02; BBC 
Monitoring, via lexis-nexis) Even so, the party has called for continued daily 
protests. So far, the people have responded, although the numbers have 
diminished to approximately 500 daily. The protests have had one effect -- the 
opening of the current semester had to be postponed by one week. There is little 
likelihood that the protests will force a reversal of policy, however. The semester 
is now open and the new law is being implemented. Moldovan children are 
learning Russian. It seems that history does repeat itself, if the right persons are 
there to force it to do so. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
GEORGIA 
Will there be a TAG? 
Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia are expected to formalize arrangements for joint 
efforts against organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism at a two-day 
meeting in Ankara. Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem put forward the idea 
during a visit to Georgia and Azerbaijan in October. This effort builds on the 
Security Pact concept which was proposed in 1999 but never institutionalized. 
(TREND, 1430 GMT, 9 Jan 02; via BBC Monitoring, and ANATOLIA, 1444 GMT, 
5 Jan 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0105, via World News Connection) Some reports in 
the Azeri media anticipate a more ambitious political agenda. This cooperation 
may grow to include protecting pipelines, defining approaches to resolving the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and possibly hosting a Turkish military base in 
Azerbaijan. (ANS, 1700 GMT, 8 Jan 02; via BBC Monitoring) 
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How long will Russian 'peacekeepers' stay in Abkhazia? 
The mandate of the Russian "peacekeeping force" in Abkhazia ran out on 31 
December and President Eduard Shevardnadze has called for extending their 
stay since no UN peacekeepers have been allocated to replace them. The 
"peacekeepers" have been deployed in the area since 1994 and have not been 
able (or willing) to ensure the security of local residents or facilitate the return of 
refugees to the region. "They are actually only fulfilling the role of a frontier post 
between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia," says Jemal Gakhokidze, deputy 
secretary of Georgia's National Security Council. (INTERFAX, 1217 GMT, 9 Jan 
02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0109, via World News Connection) 
 
Political opposition to the "peacekeepers'" presence has been building steadily 
and became particularly acute due to the aggravation in Georgia's Kodori region 
in October. At that time the parliament resolved that the Russian "peacekeepers" 
in Abkhazia should be replaced by an international force. Even President Putin 
advocated their removal. The situation became even more tense as Georgia 
stationed 350 army servicemen in the Kodori Gorge in response to the outings 
conducted by renegade Chechens and Georgian militias. (ITAR-TASS, 2047 
GMT, 21 Dec 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1221, via World News Connection) Since 
October, the repeated instances of Russian airplanes bombing Georgian villages 
in the Kodori Gorge and in and around the Pankisi Gorge hardly enhance 
Russia's supposed "impartiality." (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 12 Dec & 24 Oct 
01) 
 
Pressure to police Pankisi builds 
Roughly 200 members of the Union of Afghan Veterans have been holding 
pickets demanding the return of a police presence and operations to free 
hostages in the Pankisi region. On 9 January they were bolstered by members of 
the local Chechen population, including Khizri Aldamov, a representative of the 
Kists. (IPRINDA, 1440 GMT, 9 Jan 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0109, via World News 
Connection) Russian representatives have used the presence of renegade 
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Chechen elements in the Pankisi Gorge as a lever against Georgia. Georgia's 
security services have set up checkpoints and taken pains to isolate the troubled 
villages, but they have stopped short of carrying out law-enforcement measures 
and have not proven capable of stemming hostage-taking. In particular, the 
kidnapping of a Georgian monk who remains in the captor's custody has 
incensed public opinion. Some fear that the criminal situation in the gorge may 
be used as a pretext for a Russian invasion or for the forcible removal of roughly 
7,000 Chechen refugees from Georgia. 
 
CHECHNYA 
Soldiers kill human rights workers 
Two activists of the Society of Russian-Chechen Friendship were shot at a 
checkpoint by Russian servicemen on 12 December 2001. Luisa Betergirieva 
and Umar Musaev were traveling by car to Argun to collect information 
concerning casualties among civilians resulting from the "cleansing" carried out 
there on 11 December. When the two human rights workers reached a 
checkpoint at the entrance to Argun, the servicemen checked their documents 
but did not allow them to enter the town. Betergirieva and Musaev got back into 
the car and started driving back, in the direction of Shali. Then the servicemen 
opened fire on their car. Betergirieva died at the scene and Musaev was lightly 
wounded. (PRESS RELEASE NO. 150, 15 Dec 01; via 
www.friendly.narod.ru/info150.html) 
 
Five days later, servicemen shot Akhmed Ezhiev, Luisa's brother, who had given 
an oration at her funeral and also worked with the human rights group. 
Servicemen arrived at Ezhiev's house in an APC, asked for him by name, and 
shot him in front of three witnesses. The human rights group says that "the 
intensification of repressions" against its workers began "after Society of 
Russian-Chechen Friendship received a grant from the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED)" to collect information about human rights violations and 
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military crimes. (RUSSIAN-CHECHEN FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY, 28 Dec 01; via 
ichkeria.org) 
 
These incidents, in which Russian soldiers deliberately eliminated human rights 
workers, mock the international community. It's one thing when Russia's oft-
repeated promises to curb atrocities and investigate human rights abuses go 
unfulfilled. It's another when Russian soldiers eliminate human rights workers -- 
after having verified their identities. Only three weeks earlier, on 26-28 
November, at a meeting hosted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, representatives of Russia's government and NGO sector had reached 
an agreement to facilitate investigation of abuses and atrocities in Chechnya. 
 
Chechnya's government extends term 
Chechnya held presidential and parliamentary elections on 27 January 1997 for a 
five-year term, which would expire on 27 January 2002. However, due to the 
impossibility of holding elections during wartime, the mandate of the president 
and parliament was extended. According to Resolution 5 of the Chechen 
Parliament (carried by the official Chechen news service, chechenpress.com) the 
Chechen parliament extended its own and the president's powers until the 
"occupiers" leave and conditions for holding elections are restored. 
 
In a decree dated 31 August 2001 but published on 24 December 2001, the 
Chechen president relieved Vice President Vakha Arsanov of his duties. 
 
On 24 December, Chechenpress.com also carried Maskhadov's order 545 of 22 
November 2000 [sic] depriving Hamzat (Ruslan) Gelaev of command and 
demoting him from the rank of division general to the rank of private. Maskhadov 
held Gelaev responsible for incorrect decisions that led to hundreds of casualties 
among Chechen fighters in the village Komsomolskoye in the spring 2000. 
However, it seems that Gelaev's most serious transgressions pertain to his 
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activities in Georgia. According to the edict, Gelaev showed "cowardice" by 
"factually deserting the area of combat" and going "to a neighboring state." 
 
It's not clear whether the decrees were published late or had been backdated. 
Members of the government, including Deputy Prime Minister Akhmed Zakaev, 
who held talks with Russian representatives in November, stressed that the 
changes in personnel did not result from Moscow's pressure. 
(CHECHENPRESS.COM, 27 Dec 01) Previously Maskhadov had condemned 
Gelaev's outing to Georgia's Kodori Gorge in October in no uncertain terms and 
mentioned that he had enacted an order demoting Gelaev. (RADIO LIBERTY, 11 
Oct 01) But why wasn't the text of the decree published then? Similarly, Vakha 
Arsanov did not participate in the Defense Council Meeting of Chechen 
commanders which met 26 November and endorsed Maskhadov's approaches to 
peace. Arsanov's absence from that meeting was both noteworthy and 
unexplained. (RADIO LIBERTY, 26 Nov 01) (Shamil Basaev was also absent 
from the November meeting without explanation.) 
 
Arsanov has been widely considered a patron of the hostage trade and his ouster 
may indicate growing pressure on Maskhadov to take decisive steps against 
criminal elements among the Chechen fighters. Similarly, Gelaev's presence in 
the Pankisi Gorge exposed the refugees and the Georgian government to 
possible retribution. On 1 October 2001 Anna Politkovskaya had reported in 
Novaya gazeta that a "third force" among the Chechen resistance, which aligns 
neither with Maskhadov nor with the radicals, had demanded that Khattab be 
liquidated. Arsanov's and Gelaev's ouster may represent an external 
manifestation of these internal Chechen tensions. 
 
Where's Waldo? 
Acting on an 18-month-old extradition request, Turkey's and Azerbaijan's security 
services have started looking for Movladi Udugov. This quest is bound to be 
fruitless since it is widely known that Udugov lives in Qatar. Udugov "has been 
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living in Qatar all this time and has never stayed in Istanbul or Ankara for more 
than two days," a former field commander told Kommersant on 10 January 2002. 
 
Although he served in the Chechen government in the early stages, by 1999 
Udugov had become the architect of the Congress of Ichkeria and Dagestan (a 
shadow government that aimed at ousting Maskhadov), which together with 
Dagestani radicals launched the August 1999 attacks into Dagestan. Soon after 
the war started, Udugov was denounced in Chechnya and fled to Qatar from 
where he continues to run the Kavkaz-tsentr website. On 17 December, 
journalists from Vremya novostei visited Udugov's close associate, Zelimkhan 
Yanderbiev, in Qatar. 
 
Several explanations for the half-hearted effort to find Udugov have been 
adduced in the press. Kommersant commented on 10 January that looking for 
Udugov where he can't be found is an easy way to curry favor. Another 
commentary in the same paper on 11 January makes comparisons to the recent 
trial of Salman Raduev, where Russian generals and security chiefs refused to 
give evidence. If they testified against Raduev, they would also incriminate 
themselves in the shelling of the village Pervomaiskoye during the first Chechen 
war. 
 
There is another possible explanation for the sudden interest in Udugov's 
extradition. In December Boris Berezovsky revived accusations that the FSB 
organized the bombings in Russian cities in September 1999 that triggered the 
war and brought Putin to power. An English-language edition of the 27 August 
2001 Novaya gazeta publication "FSB Blows Up Russia," co-authored by a 
former FSB and MVD agent, Alexander Litvinenko, is due out next month under 
the title Blowing up Russia. Perhaps, the remote possibility that Russia may seek 
Udugov's extradition is meant to inhibit Berezovsky from making further 
revelations. In his book, Godfather of the Kremlin, Paul Klebnikov reproduced 
transcripts of conversations between Berezovsky and Udugov which implicate 
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both men in the hostage trade. If Udugov was to stand trial in Russia, this issue 
could well be introduced in court. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Michael Donahue 
 
Drifting ever farther away from Moscow 
From Tashkent to Dushanbe and every Central Asian capital in between, 
Moscow has begun to smell the odor of defeat. The recent acceptance of a semi-
permanent American military presence in the region, once vehemently opposed 
by Moscow, has become the latest in a growing string of setbacks for continued 
Russian hegemony in an area that was once solidly in Moscow's grasp. As 
reported in October, Russia's growing crisis of influence in the region was 
exponentially exacerbated by, but not limited to, the security guarantees 
contained in the US-Uzbek agreement of 12 October. Indeed, in the long term 
the security implications will appear insignificant compared to the economic and 
commercial losses that Moscow is on the verge of realizing through no fault of 
Osama bin Laden. 
 
The well-publicized October accord between Washington and Uzbek President 
Islam Karimov essentially traded American security guarantees for Karimov's 
government in exchange for the rights to base air and ground troops in 
Uzbekistan in support of actions in Afghanistan. While not exactly the equivalent 
of the Magna Carta or the Declaration of Independence, this important document 
began the process that turned trickles of sovereignty into an avalanche of 
independence and national self-assertion. US Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld's November courtship of Tajikistan, once considered the bedrock of 
remaining Russian influence in the region, likewise produced a deal to position 
US forces at key airbases in and around Kulyab. Finally in a recent quid pro quo 
visit to Washington, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev signed a joint 
 27 
statement with President George W. Bush affirming that the two nations shared 
commitments to a "peaceful, prosperous and sovereign Kazakhstan." Beyond the 
subtle hints of supporting a more autonomous (less-Russian) Kazakhstan, the 
key elements of the statement include calls for advancing bilateral cooperation in 
regional security and market-based development of energy resources. The latter 
point was further emphasized during the visit when Karimov inked an "Energy 
Partnership Declaration" with Secretary of State Colin Powell. (EURASIA 
INSIGHT, 4 Jan 02; via Eurasianet) Of late, there are signs also of a closer US-
Kyrgyz relationship. 
 
If growing American influence in regional security and energy policies were not 
troubling enough, Russian President Vladimir Putin has to contend with the beast 
from the East, China, which is also hungry for a larger role in Central Asian 
affairs. With much to gain from exploiting regional energy reserves and 
commerce markets, and even more in terms of geopolitical influence, China 
seems determined to bind itself closely to the future of Central Asia. Taking 
advantage of such Chinese interest and in an effort to transform the region into a 
transit hub for trade between China and the West, many Central Asian states, 
including Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are building new or 
improving existing road and rail networks to facilitate the movement of persons, 
durable goods, and eventually Caspian Sea energy resources. (EURASIA 
INSIGHT, 12 Dec 01; via Eurasianet) 
 
 Russian responses to such penetrations thus far have amounted to lame 
rhetoric and weak coalition agreements, such as the one reached by the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on 7 January. Designed to establish 
the organization as Central Asia's key player on security issues, the SCO's 
agreement did more to highlight contemporary Russian foreign policy 
weaknesses than to demonstrate regional solidarity. (EURASIA INSIGHT, 8 Jan 
02; via Eurasianet) One need look only at the members of the organization to 
understand that their interests are anything but "shared." Russian hegemonical 
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interests are directly opposed by China, and also resented by Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. The Central Asian states, 
despite the SCO proclamation, are themselves drawing closer, and turning east 
toward China and west toward Europe and America. These days nobody's 
compass seems to be pointing north toward Uncle Vladimir. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Michael Varuolo 
 
ESTONIA 
Transition in Estonia 
Issues of NATO accession and EU membership recently have taken on a whole 
new meaning in Estonia as the country seeks to avoid a domestic power vacuum 
caused by the resignation of Prime Minister Mart Laar. Laar resigned from office 
on 8 January amid intense political maneuvering within the ruling coalition. Since 
his resignation automatically forces the resignation of all government ministers, 
newly elected President Arnold Ruutel now faces the arduous task of appointing 
a prime minister who has the political leverage to form a functioning coalition 
government. Ruutel has until 23 January to comply with Estonian Constitutional 
law and appoint a new PM, but insists that he will not rush the decision. (ETA, 
1241 GMT, 9 Jan 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0109, via World News Connection) 
 
Laar was the longest-serving prime minister and has achieved much success in 
recent years while pursuing market reforms and pushing the country towards the 
Western institutions of NATO and the EU. Despite his successes, many 
Estonians feel Laar no longer represents their views. (AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, 8 Jan 02; via lexis-nexis). It was this dissension that caused the 
Reform Party to break from the ruling coalition and align itself with the opposition 
Center Party during the Tallinn municipal elections. This formed a monumental 
rift in the coalition that supports Laar as prime minister. The rift rapidly destroyed 
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the coalition's ability to cooperate at the federal level and eventually led to Laar's 
stepping down. 
 
The leading candidate to replace Laar is the leader of the Reform Party and 
former Finance Minister Siim Kallas. Kallas would face a difficult task of forming a 
new government, from a base that would only maintain control as a minority 
coalition with 48 of the 101 parliamentary seats. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 8 
Jan 02; via lexis-nexis) Although the Center/Reform Party coalition shifts the 
balance of power away from the center-right nationalist policies of the Laar 
coalition, both groups favor NATO accession and EU membership. Still, attempts 
to achieve these goals may be overshadowed by the instability caused by 
domestic maneuvering as the parties vie for power.  
 
This comes at an unfortunate time for Estonia as some members of the US 
Senate have begun to show reluctance concerning NATO expansion. They are 
raising questions about legislation concerning NATO enlargement: The Freedom 
of Consolidation Act recently was blocked by Senator John Warner of Virginia. 
The legislation will not be revisited until later this year; if Warner gets his way, 
each aspirant country will be reviewed individually based upon readiness and 
official government evaluations of its status. (BNS, 1237 GMT, 28 Dec 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-1228, via World News Connection) In the case of Estonia, a domestic 
power vacuum could prove decisive for a skeptical US Senate. Despite a strong 
membership application and encouraging reforms, as George Robertson pointed 
out, NATO membership "is not a privilege, a gift or a prize, but a huge 
responsibility which sometimes can be a burden." (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 
28 Nov 01; via lexis-nexis) -- a burden that could be difficult to shoulder without a 
strong central government. 
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